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In the situation known as the cable guy paradox, the expected utility principle and the avoid certain
frustration (ACF) principle seem to give contradictory advice aboutwhat one should do.This article
tries to resolve the paradox by presenting an example that weakens the grip of ACF: a modified
version of the cable guy problem is introduced in which the choice dictated by ACF loses much of
its intuitive appeal.
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In the situation known as the cable guy paradox (Hájek 2005), the expected utility
principle and the avoid certain frustration (ACF) principle seem to give contradictory
advice about what one should do. Although Alan Hájek, the father of the cable guy
paradox, ultimately rejects the advice derived from ACF, he concedes that something of
a paradox still remains.
This article tries to remove the lingering appearance of a paradox by presenting an
example that weakens the grip of ACF: a modified version of the cable guy problem will
be introduced in which the choice dictated by ACF loses much of its intuitive appeal.
Let us first recall the original paradox.The cable guywill come to your home tomorrow
sometime after 8 a.m. and before 4 p.m. Your friend proposes a bet, on even money, on
whether the cable guy will come in the morning (between 8 and 12) or in the afternoon
(between 12 and 4). You can choosewhich option youwant to bet on. Since the probability
of MORNING or AFTERNOON is the same (one half) and since your potential gain and
loss are also the same (the assumption is that nothing else matters but money), it seems
you should be indifferent between the two options. This answer is based on the expected
utility principle.
Then Hájek introduces an alternative argument (which he in the end rejects) in favor
of AFTERNOON. If you bet onMORNING, there will inevitably be somemoment in the
morning (before the cable guy arrives) when you will be aware that some of “your” time
has elapsed, and consequently the probability of AFTERNOON will at that moment be
higher than the probability of MORNING. Since it is certain that at some point you will
be frustrated with your choice if you chooseMORNING, but it is not certain that you will
be frustrated with your choice if you choose AFTERNOON, there is a suggestion that you
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Figure 1: The cable guy problemmodified.
should bet on AFTERNOON. This suggestion is based on ACF, which Hájek formulates
in the following way:
Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) Principle: Suppose you now have a choice between
two options. You should not choose one of these options if you are certain that a
rational future self of yours will prefer that you had chosen the other one – unless
both your options have this property. (Hájek 2005, p. 114)
Hájek notes that the choice to bet on MORNING “falls squarely under the purview”
of ACF, which conflicts with what is recommended by the principle of expected utility
(namely, that one should be indifferent between the two choices). One way to solve
the paradox would be to put ACF itself in question by constructing a counterexample
in which all of Hájek’s conditions for applying ACF are satisfied but where there is no
imperative to ACF. This is what I will attempt to do.
Let us first change the conditions of the bet. Let us divide the entire period between
8 a.m. and 4 p.m. into the following four temporally consecutive subintervals: ε1 (the
trillionth-of-a-second interval after 8 a.m.), MORNING − ε1 (the rest of the morning),
ε2 (the trillionth-of-a-second interval after 12 noon), and AFTERNOON − ε2 (the rest
of the afternoon).
Or, to put it in more exact terms:
ε1 = (8, 8+ε]
MORNING − ε1 = (8+ε, 12]
ε2 = (12, 12+ε]
AFTERNOON – ε2 = (12+ε, 4)
The division is shown in Figure 1 (not drawn to scale), which represents the whole
period between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m.
Now in the new version of the cable guy problem, the choice is between betting on one
of the two time periods in the figure that are represented by white and gray, respectively.
Your options now are betting either onW (thewhite segment) or onG (the gray segment):
Betting on W means you win if the cable guy arrives during ε1 or during (AFTER-
NOON – ε2), and you lose otherwise.
Betting on G means you win if the cable guy arrives during (MORNING – ε1) or
during ε2, and you lose otherwise.
The difference between this and the original cable guy scenario is that now your first
option includes betting on a time that consists of two noncontiguous intervals: ε1 and
(AFTERNOON – ε2). However, the intervals W and G are still of the same duration
2 Thought (2018) © 2018 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Neven Sesardic´ Avoid Certain Frustration
(exactly 4 hours each), so according to the expected utility principle you should again
be indifferent between the two choices.
ACF, however, clearly favors G, because choosingW would lead to certain frustration
of your future rational self (during the initial interval ε1). For, whether the cable guy
arrives during ε1 or not, there will certainly be an interval, during ε1, when you will regret
choosingW, since you will realize that some of “your” time has elapsed without the cable
guy coming and that consequently your chance of winning just became (be it even very
slightly) lower than .5.
Although it is indeed certain that a rational future self of yours will regret the choice
ofW, let us look at how another rational future self of yours would feel at a still later time.
If you choose G, what is the probability that a later self of yours will at some future time
regret that choice? Obviously, this probability is equal to the probability that the cable
guy does not arrive during the interval (8, 8+ 2ε]. Explanation: a future self will regret
choosing G just as long as the cable guy has not yet arrived and the remaining portion of
G time ahead is shorter than the remaining portion ofW time. If after 8 o’clock the short
period of the duration 2ε expires without the cable guy arriving, then a future self would
regret choosing G.
Since 2ε is an extremely small part of the whole time periodwithinwhich the cable guy
can arrive, the probability that the guy will not come during that period is very high. So
the probability that a “post-2ε” rational future self of yours will be frustrated if you choose
G is very, very high (although lower than unity). And the probability that a rational later
self of yours will regret making choice G in this kind of scenario can be made as close to
unity as we like—by making the interval 2ε smaller and smaller.
Now back to ACF. ACF is based on the idea that, other things being equal, a judgment
of one’s later rational self (during ε1) should carry more weight (because it is based on
more comprehensive evidence) than the judgment of one’s earlier rational self (before
8 a.m.). But why shouldn’t we then extend this reasoning and also take into account a
judgment of an even later rational self (after ε1), especially since this self is also expected
to be frustrated with a very high probability? Admittedly, choosing W entails that one’s
early future rational self—during ε1—will certainly regret one’s decision. Choosing G,
however, entails that one’s later future rational self will regret one’s decision with the
probability that can bemade as close to unity as desired (bymaking ε smaller and smaller).
The probabilities of frustration in the cases of the two decisions can be made as close to
one another as you like.
But then it is unclear why one should followACF.There is nothing obviously irrational
about going against ACF and betting on W, with its certain frustration of one’s earlier
future self, rather than betting on G, with its frustration of one’s later future self with a
probability that can be made as close to certainty as we please.
Hájek was not convinced by my argument, though. This is his response (personal
communication):
But in a way [your example] only strengthens my paradoxical reasoning. Suppose
you bet on G. You will certainly be glad for a little while, during period ε1. You will
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enjoy watchingW dwindle, for a short time. Then yes, very probably you will begin a
period of frustration as we enter the gray region, and G begins to dwindle. So you
will experience:
(i) gladness certainly, and
(ii) frustration (only) very probably.
On the other hand, if you bet on W, you will experience:
(i) frustration certainly, and
(ii) gladness (only) very probably.
So there are now two reasons to prefer G toW!
1. CERTAIN gladness is better than PROBABLE gladness.
2. PROBABLE frustration is better than CERTAIN frustration.
My argument based on ACF only gave you one reason to do so!
Note that Hájek stresses that he does not ultimately advocate ACF—indeed the
conclusion of his paperwas to reject it—nor the reasoning in the above passage.However,
he offers both as prima facie plausible, and finds it surprising that they must be rejected.
I disagree with Hájek’s response, but I think it is very useful because it helps us probe
deeper into the core of the cable guy paradox.
His two reasons for preferring G overW are: on one hand, certain gladness (the result
of choosing G) is better than merely probable gladness (the result of choosing W), and
on the other hand, merely probable frustration (the result of choosing G) is better than
certain frustration (the result of choosingW).
The reasoning would be convincing if certain and probable frustration—or certain
and probable gladness—associated with the two respective decisions were quantitatively
the same. But they are not.
Take frustration first. Recall that here we are talking about the frustration of one’s
future self if a part of one’s time elapses without the cable guy arriving, which proportion-
ately decreases one’s chances of winning the bet. Now it is obvious that the (certain) frus-
tration resulting from choosing W will be very small. The worst case scenario would be
that your future self would realize toward the end of theminuscule interval ε1 that almost
one trillionth of a second of “your” time has elapsed, and that consequently your chances
of winning the bet would have diminished only by a practically negligible amount.
If you choose G, though, your future frustration will indeed not be certain but it will
be practically indistinguishable from certainty. In addition, this frustration will not be
containedwithin the very narrow range ε, as in the choice ofW. On the contrary, choosing
G you will risk a much larger frustration, that is, realizing with regret that a much higher
proportion of your time than ε has elapsed without the cable guy coming. (At the limit
there is a probability of around 1/2 that you will go through successive and ever larger
levels of frustration until almost your entire time expires without the cable guy arriving.)
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Briefly, if choosing betweenW and G comes down to choosing between the certainty
of a virtually zero frustration and the high probability (very closely approaching certainty)
of amuch larger frustration, it is far from clear that choosing G is preferable.
Ditto for gladness. Is Hájek right that certain gladness is better than merely probable
gladness? Again, no. When a certain but tiny gladness is pitted against a much larger
gladness that is virtually (though not actually) certain, an argument could be made for
choosing the latter. Let me stress I do not want to defend that other argument. I merely
use it to show that the reasoning in favor of ACF that Hájek finds prima facie plausible
loses its force on closer inspection.
Contra Hájek, two out of three possible reasons favor choosing interval W over
interval G. First, in the case of choosing W potential frustration would be smaller and
potential gladness greater (than if one chose G). Second, deferring to the judgment of
one’s later rational self (in the spirit of Van Fraassen’s reflection principle) also supports
choosingW, because an almost certain frustration expected by one who chose G would
happen after a certain frustration expected by one who choseW. (Andmutatis mutandis
for gladness). Third, the only reason apparently favoring interval G is that the future
frustration is certain for one who chooses W, though not for one who chooses G. But,
to repeat, the difference between certainty and a probability that we can make as close to
certainty as we like should not carry much weight.
So should one always follow ACF? Perhaps not.
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